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Following Weinstein’s (1980) pioneering work many studies established that people have
an optimistic bias concerning future life events. At first, the bulk of research was con-
ducted using populations in North America and Northern Europe, the optimistic bias was
thought of as universal, and little attention was paid to cultural context. However, constru-
ing unrealistic optimism as a form of self-enhancement, some researchers noted that it
was far less common in East Asian cultures. The current study extends enquiry to a differ-
ent non-Western culture. Two hundred and eighty seven middle aged and middle income
participants (200 in India, 87 in England) rated 11 positive and 11 negative events in terms
of the chances of each event occurring in “their own life,” and the chances of each event
occurring in the lives of “people like them.” Comparative optimism was shown for bad
events, with Indian participants showing higher levels of optimism than English partici-
pants. The position regarding comparative optimism for good events was more complex.
In India those of higher socioeconomic status (SES) were optimistic, while those of lower
SES were on average pessimistic. Overall, English participants showed neither optimism
nor pessimism for good events. The results, whose clinical relevance is discussed, sug-
gest that the expression of unrealistic optimism is shaped by an interplay of culture and
socioeconomic circumstance.
Keywords: unrealistic optimism, culture, India, England, self-enhancement
INTRODUCTION
Ever since its original demonstration by Weinstein (1980) a great
deal of empirical work and theoretical attention has been devoted
to the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism. The term refers to a
bias whereby“people rate negative events as less likely to happen to
themselves than to the average person and positive events as more
likely to happen to themselves than to the average person” (Harris
and Hahn, 2011, p. 135). In accounting for the optimistic bias,
many researchers have seen it as an instance of the more general
“self-enhancing bias.”Further, far from being maladaptive an opti-
mistic bias even if “unrealistic” has long been held to be associated
with psychological well-being (Taylor and Brown, 1988), and con-
versely, a pessimistic bias is thought to be involved in depression
(Abramson et al., 1978; Miranda and Mennin, 2007).
SELF-ENHANCEMENT, UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM, AND CULTURE
The majority of the early research on unrealistic optimism in the
1980s and 1990s was conducted on participants in the USA (q.v.
meta-analysis of a perceived control and optimistic bias, Klein
and Helweg-Larsen, 2002) and it was some time before psychol-
ogists questioned the ubiquity of the unrealistic optimism bias.
Noting that the self-enhancing bias thought to underlie unrealis-
tic optimism is itself not universal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991)
and considerably less prevalent in cultures with an interdependent
construal of self, Heine and Lehman (1995) investigated unrealis-
tic optimism in Canada and Japan. Canadian respondents showed
optimism on both positive and negative items whether they were
making relative or absolute judgments about their likelihood of
experiencing these events in comparison to their peers. In contrast,
Japanese respondents only showed unrealistic optimism in one
specific domain, i.e., relative likelihood estimated for negative
events and Heine and Lehman (1995) speculated that this “specific
pocket”of optimism for their Japanese respondents was related to a
possible methodological artifact in their study. Heine and Lehman
(1995) concluded overall that“self-enhancing biases (such as unre-
alistic optimism) are, for the most part, absent from the Japanese
motivational repertoire because the consequent attention to the
individual that self-enhancement engenders is not valued in inter-
dependent cultures” (p. 595). However, some studies have found
evidence of optimistic bias in non-Western interdependent cul-
tures. For example, Chang et al. (2001) found an optimistic bias
regarding the likelihood of negative everyday events not only in the
responses of European Americans but also of Japanese. Although
Chang et al. (2001) found no evidence of an optimistic bias for
positive events among European Americans, they did find evi-
dence of a pessimistic bias for positive events among Japanese.
In a subsequent study Chang and Asakawa (2003) asked respon-
dents to compare their likelihood of experiencing atypical events
in comparison not to a “similar other” as is usual in comparative
optimism studies, but to a sibling. With this alteration of focus,
Chang and Asakawa (2003) now found European Americans dis-
playing an optimistic bias regarding both positive and negative
events, and the Japanese showing no bias in either direction for
positive events and a pessimistic bias for negative events.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: MEASUREMENT AND SAMPLING
More recently, work has differentiated between cognitive biases
(such as informational egocentrism) and motivational biases (such
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as self-enhancement), and suggested that the emergence of these
biases depends on the method used to examine risk perception
(Chambers and Windschitl, 2004; Harris and Hahn, 2011). Ask-
ing participants to assess their own likelihood of experiencing an
event, and assess separately the likelihood of a specific compari-
son group experiencing the same event, is known as the indirect
method. Asking participants a single question where they must
compare their likelihood of experiencing a particular event in
comparison to another group/type of person (e.g., for a student
sample –“how likely are you to have a heart attack before the age of
40, compared to the average student of your age/sex”) is known as
the direct method and is thought to exacerbate respondents’ sus-
ceptibility to cognitive biases, such as statistical regression to the
mean and subjective assessment of risk frequency (Lichtenstein
et al., 1978). In a study where participants made direct comparison
likelihood estimates, both Japanese and USA respondents showed
unrealistic optimism about infrequent negative events and unreal-
istic pessimism about frequent negative events (Rose et al., 2008).
Proposing that base rate biases are more detrimental to the judg-
ment of the probability of others experiencing events than they are
to probability judgments concerning the self, the authors interpret
the optimistic bias shown in their study as being related more to
a “culture-free” cognitive bias than to a “culture-specific” motiva-
tional bias. In the same study cultural differences did emerge when
the participants made indirect judgments and under these condi-
tions Japanese respondents showed considerably less optimism
than USA respondents.
In summary, to date research does suggest that the tendency to
self-enhance and show unrealistic optimism is very robust among
Westerners, and not subject to methodological nuance. In con-
trast, non-Western samples show far less self-enhancement and
such unrealistic optimism as is shown is limited to certain methods
(Heine and Hamamura, 2007). However, a striking aspect of the
unrealistic optimism literature is that the cultures used in the stud-
ies are somewhat restricted. The most frequently used exemplars
of Western cultures are USA and Canada, and the most frequently
used exemplars of non-Western cultures are East Asian cultures
(such as Japan and Korea; Heine and Hamamura, 2007; Klein and
Helweg-Larsen, 2002). East Asian cultures are paradigmatic exam-
ples of cultures with an interdependent rather than an independent
construal of self, but they may also have related characteristics
which play a part in their lack optimistic bias. For example, it has
been noted that the weakness or absence of self-enhancing moti-
vations among people of East Asian descent is found “specifically
(among) those that participate in Confucian cultures” (Heine and
Hamamura, 2007, p. 5). Research is needed to investigate whether
members of other cultures with an interdependent concept of self
also show a lack of optimistic bias when judging their relative risk
of experiencing negative and positive events.
UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM AND INDIA
India is the location for a set of cultures characterized as hav-
ing an interdependent concept of self (Roland, 1988; Mascalo and
Bhatia, 2002; Mascalo et al., 2004)1. Many aspects of parent-child
1Whether the peoples of India can be described as sharing a culture has been the
subject of intense debate (Ramanujan, 1989; Khilnani, 1997). On the one hand the
interaction in India are frequently used to exemplify the develop-
ment of the interdependent self (Shweder et al., 1995; Saraswathi
and Ganapathy, 2002; Kapadia and Miller, 2005). Further, two of
the classic studies which illustrate the contrasting attributional
styles of those who have independent and interdependent con-
cepts of self drew their non-Western samples from India (Shweder
and Bourne, 1982; Miller, 1984). Closely related to the distinction
between independent and interdependent concepts of self is the
description of cultures as individualistic or collectivist, and just
as East Asian cultures have been categorized as collectivist, so too
has India (Hoftsede, 1980; Triandis and Suh, 2002)2. While it has
been argued that“the Indian psyche”is best understood as individ-
ualistic as well as collectivistic (Sinha and Tripathi, 1994; Kumar,
2004), it can confidently be said that, in many aspects of their philo-
sophical position and emphasis on social harmony and hierarchy,
cultures in India (spanning a variety of religions including Hin-
duism and Islam) share much with East Asian Confucian cultures
(Laungani, 2007)3. Therefore, like East Asians, Indian participants
might well be expected not to show unrealistic optimism.
As explicated above, discussion of cultural differences in unre-
alistic optimism has focused on contrasting North Americans and
East Asians, and in particular has debated the motivating force
of self-enhancement. But self-enhancement is only one of the
motivational mechanisms thought to be involved in unrealistic
optimism. Another mechanism is the illusion of control (Langer,
1975). While self-enhancement and the illusion of control can
both be regarded as instances of a more general self-serving bias,
particularly due to their co-occurrence in the motivational reper-
toire of Westerners, it is useful to conceptualize these variables as
separate. A study by McKenna (1993) indicated that, among UK
participants, unrealistic optimism was not so much a generalized
expectancy for a positive outcome but more closely related to the
extent to which the participant had control over the outcome. If
the illusion of control is heavily involved in unrealistic optimism,
one would expect to find less unrealistic optimism among respon-
dents whose culture places less value on control. Among cultures
in India, Hinduism in particular has been portrayed as such a cul-
ture. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Kakar writes “With the
Hindu emphasis on man’s inner limits, there is not that sense of
urgency and struggle against the outside world, with the prospects
of sudden metamorphoses and great achievements just around the
corner, that often seems to propel Western lives” (Kakar, 1978, p.
49). Laungani suggests that “The law of karma allows a Hindu to
geopolitical entity that is India encompasses a variety of religions, languages, and
cultural practices. On the other hand in their observations of India, authors ranging
from psychoanalysts such as Roland (1988) to anthropologists such as Alvi (2007)
find a cultural commonality beneath the layered and apparently divergent char-
acteristics. It is noteworthy that Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of modern India,
while commenting on the tremendous diversity of India made much of its “essential
unity” and “common outlook on life” (Nehru, 1961, p. 59).
2On Hofstede’s I/C scale India scores 48 which is very similar to Japan’s score of 46,
but higher than the scores of Hong Kong 25, China 20, South Korea 18, and Taiwan
17. The UK’s score is 89 (http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html).
3On the specific topic of hierarchy, Srinivas (1962) noted that the phenomenon of
caste “cuts across religious divisions – it is not only Hindus who are segmented
into castes but also Jains, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians (p. 103). Indeed Srinivas
(1962) suggested that “The institution of caste provides a common cultural idiom
to Indians: wherever one may be in India, one is in a universe of caste” (p. 103).
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accept with passivity and fortitude the vicissitudes of life” (Laun-
gani, 2007, p. 200). Empirical studies of response to misfortune,
such as chronic illness, suggest that the connection between pos-
itive adjustment, perceived control and lay causal reasoning so
often found in the West (Taylor and Brown, 1988) is not found
in Indian patients (q.v. Joshi, 1995). A series of studies by Savani
and colleagues also indicate that the discourses of control and
“choosing according to one’s personal preferences may not be
as important to the experience of agency for Indians as it is for
North Americans” (Savani et al., 2008, p. 861; Savani et al., 2010,
2011).
UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS
The discussion of culture, unrealistic optimism, and the self-
enhancement bias has predominantly been concerned with
notions of the independent/interdependent self in individual-
istic/collectivist societies. An entirely different explanation for
self-enhancement has recently been suggested by Loughnan et al.
(2011). In their 15 nation study, differences between nations in
the extent of self-enhancement (evidenced by people’s tendency
to see themselves as better than the average person on a vari-
ety of personality traits and values) were better predicted by
the extent of income inequality in those countries than by indi-
vidualism/collectivism scores. For example, in Loughnan et al.’s
(2011) data set, Korea and Peru have very different profiles despite
both being at the collectivist end of the I-C scale (Hoftsede,
2001). Korea has low income inequality (as measured by the
Gini coefficient) and low self-enhancement scores; Peru has high
income inequality and high self-enhancement scores (the lat-
ter being far higher than those shown by the USA in the same
data set). In explaining the apparent connection between self-
enhancement and income inequality, Loughnan et al. (2011)
suggest that self-enhancement relates to factors that result from
socioeconomic differences, such as the drive to compete for
social superiority thought by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) to
be characteristic of living in a socially and economically unequal
society.
A major limitation of much research in comparative optimism,
and indeed in social psychology in general, is its reliance on stu-
dent participants (Henrich et al., 2010). Few if any studies have
compared rates of unrealistic optimism and self-enhancement for
different socioeconomic groups within a culture. Loughnan et al.
(2011) do raise the issue of whether self-enhancement might vary
not only between societies but within societies. Their own sample
was drawn predominantly from students who they suggest “might
often find themselves in situations in which their social standing
in actually better than the average person’s, an effect which would
be more pronounced in societies with more income inequality”
(Loughnan et al., 2011, p. 1257). As Loughnan et al. (2011) point
out, comparative optimism studies do attempt to “guard against
this confound” (p. 1257) by having participants compare them-
selves with the average other from their own group. Given the
current study’s interest in the relationship between optimism and
inequality, it will be important to sample from more than one
socioeconomic group.
In addition to addressing theoretical issues concerning cul-
ture and unrealistic optimism, the results of the study may have
some bearing on applied health issues. Unrealistic optimism and
pessimism are event-specific biases“manifested by individuals, but
measured at the level of the group” (Jansen et al., 2011, p. 2). In
the case of epidemiologically common risks, high levels of opti-
mism are of clinical interest as they may well discourage disease
preventive action in those at risk (Sweeny et al., 2006; Schacter
and Addis, 2007). Cardiovascular disease (and coronary heart dis-
ease in particular) is the main cause of death in England (British
Heart Foundation, 2012). Recently, heart disease has also been
established as the foremost cause of death in India (Jha and Laxmi-
narayan, 2009). Its even higher prevalence and pattern of earlier
onset in India than in industrialized nations has been attributed
to the interplay of genetic and lifestyle factors such as fatty diet,
smoking, and lack of exercise (Kaul and Bhatia, 2010). High levels
of unrealistic optimism in England or India in respect of items
such as “risk of a heart attack” would be concerning as optimism
is likely to stand in the way of people making health promoting
behavioral changes.
Much less is known about unrealistic pessimism than about
unrealistic optimism. Such work as there is has focused on unre-
alistic pessimism about negative events, such as serious illness,
and attempted to relate pessimism to low uptake of screening
or lack of engagement with treatment (Lerman and Schwartz,
1993; Klein et al., 2010). Unrealistic pessimism, particularly about
the likelihood of experiencing positive events, may be indicative
of depression (Miranda and Mennin, 2007. Further, if rates of
unrealistic pessimism across a number of different types of event
are high, this may serve as useful indirect measure of depres-
sion at the population level, especially in social cultural con-
texts where mental illness may be stigmatized, and depression
is often presented in somatic as opposed to psychological terms
(Bhugra and Mastrogianni, 2004; Jadhav et al., 2007; Ryder et al.,
2008).
The current study sets out to explore unrealistic optimism in
India and in England among two socioeconomic groups. There are
two closely related grounds for thinking that Indian participants
will show less unrealistic optimism than English participants.
Following Heine and Hamamura (2007) and taking unrealistic
optimism to be an example of self-enhancement it can be expected
that Indian participants (likely to have an interdependent con-
cept of self typical of Asian cultures) will show less unrealistic
optimism than English participants. Following McKenna (1993)
and taking unrealistic optimism to be an example of the illu-
sion of control, it can also be expected that Indian participants
(likely to place less importance on control) will show less unreal-
istic optimism that English participants. In contrast, in the light
of Loughnan et al.’s (2011) demonstration that income inequal-
ity relates to self-enhancement, then given that India and UK
have very similar Gini coefficient income inequality scores, there
are grounds for expecting that Indian and English participants
will show very similar rates of unrealistic optimism4. Given the
4The Gini income coefficient is a measure of the deviation from a perfectly equal
distribution of income among individuals or households within a country, where 0
represents absolute equality and 100 represents absolute inequality. On this measure
India’s coefficient of 36.8% is very similar to the UK’s coefficient of 36.0% (United
Nations Development Programme, 2010).
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opposing arguments which characterize the background literature,
no directional predictions will be made.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
INSTRUMENT
In the spirit of a derived etic approach (Berry, 1989), Weinstein’s
(1980) future event list, developed for use in his original study
using female students at Rutgers University, USA, was taken as the
starting point for the current study. Giving “being injured while
skiing” as an example, Weinstein cogently pointed out that even in
one culture there can be “no obvious relevant precondition that
would make any event relevant to only a limited number of peo-
ple” (1980, p. 809). Pilot work was conducted to develop a list
of good and bad events suitable for use in India and England. It
was immediately apparent that some of Weinstein’s original items
would not be culturally appropriate in England or India. For exam-
ple “Car turns out to be a lemon” (Weinstein, 1980, p 810) is not
only expressed in the idiom of American slang but is unsuited to
a population where car ownership is considerably less common
than in the USA.
It was considered important in the development of the list
of events to be used in the current study to give priority to
the Indian rather than the English future participants, on the
assumption that Weinstein’s items would be even less appropri-
ate to the former rather than the latter cultural group. Three
male and three female English-Marathi bilingual Indian infor-
mants were recruited in Mumbai to evaluate the Weinstein future
event list (shortened to 22 items to exclude relatively trivial events
such as “having gum problems” and “in bed ill for two or more
days” and exclude items only relevant to students such as “grad-
uating in top third of class”). The informants rated 12 items as
suitable (or requiring only minimal rewording) and suggested 10
new items to capture good and bad events they regarded as miss-
ing from the original list (See Tables 2–5 for the list of events
used).
Mixing positive and negative items, the 22 events were placed
in a random order. Participants were asked to assess on a scale
from 0, 10, 20, . . ., 100%) the chance of each event happening in
their own life, and in the lives of people like them. There were four
versions of the questionnaire, varying order of self-other rating
and varying whether the example given was optimistic or pes-
simistic. In versions 1 and 2, for each item, the participant firstly
rated his/her own chance and then rated the chances for people
like themselves. In versions 3 and 4, for each item, the participant
firstly rated the chances for people like themselves, and then rated
his/her own chance. In versions 1 and 3, the instruction on the
questionnaire read “The chances of an event occurring in your life
may be the same or different from the chances of the event occur-
ring in the lives of people like you. For example, you may think that
the chance of your having a heart attack is 30% and the chance of
people like you having a heart attack is also 30%; or you may think
that because your health is very good the chance of your having a
heart attack is only 10% and the chance of people like you having
a heart attack is 30%.” In versions 2 and 4, the instruction read
“The chances of an event occurring in your life may be the same
or different from the chances of the event occurring in the lives
of people like you. For example, you may think that the chance of
your having a heart attack is 30% and the chance of people like you
having a heart attack is also 30%; or you may think that because
your health is not good the chance of your having a heart attack
is 70% and the chance of people like you having a heart attack
is 30%.”
The questionnaire was translated into Marathi by one flu-
ent Marathi/English speaker, and back translated into English
by another fluent Marathi/English speaker. In the case of both
speakers, Marathi was their mother tongue. Following the “com-
mittee assessment procedure” (Harkness and Schoua-Glusberg,
1998) apparent problems were resolved by a panel of three addi-
tional Marathi/English speakers, comprising one social scientist
and two professional survey designers.
PARTICIPANTS
In England, 200 administrative staff at Oxford Brookes Uni-
versity were invited by letter to respond to the questionnaire.
They had been randomly selected from the complete staff list
of administrative employes falling within the age range 25–
55 years, who numbered 414. Replies were received from 87 people
(29 males, 58 females) constituting a 44% response rate among
those asked (and 21% of the relevant work-force). The sam-
ple was divided into two socioeconomic status (SES) groups
contrasted in terms of education and occupation. Forty partic-
ipants (17 males, 23 females) had been educated to first degree
level or beyond and were in lower managerial/professional occu-
pations. Forty-seven participants (12 males, 35 females) did
not have degree level qualifications and were in “intermedi-
ate”/secretarial/clerical occupations (Office for National Statistics,
2010).
In India, participants were recruited by face-to-face invi-
tation and specific residential locations were targeted in an
attempt to match the type of occupations sampled in England.
To recruit participants in lower managerial/professional occupa-
tions, a local researcher went door-to-door in several housing
associations in Kothrud, an upper-middle income area of Pune,
India. Where a married couple participated the researcher ensured
that the questionnaires were filled in separately. Participants typ-
ically reported that they had higher degree qualifications and
were employed in the professions as engineers, accountants, and
teachers. To recruit participants in clerical occupations, a local
researcher went door-to-door in several housing associations in
a lower middle income area of Kurla, Greater Mumbai. Par-
ticipants typically reported that they had no education beyond
senior school leaving age (12th standard) and were employed
in clerical occupations in government or private sector organi-
zations. One hundred participants (50 males, 50 females) were
recruited in Pune, and 100 respondents (54 males, 46 females)
were recruited in Mumbai. The local researchers reported that no
one approached declined to take part as “they were intrigued” by
the questionnaire.
Across the entire sample, the participants’ average age was
38.9 years (SD 9.7) and this did not vary by SES or nationality.
Using standard UK Census categories, all the participants in Eng-
land classified themselves as of “white” ethnicity, and as Christian
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or of “no religion”5. The local researchers reported that all the par-
ticipants in Pune and Mumbai were Indian nationals, Hindu, and
had Marathi as their mother tongue.
EVENT EVALUATION
A second set of 92 participants was recruited to evaluate the 11
good and 11 bad events in terms of their controllability and their
desirability. Thirty-two (16 males, 16 females) of these participants
were employees at Oxford Brookes University, England: 16 in man-
agerial and 16 in clerical posts. Sixty participants were recruited
in India: 30 each (15 male, 15 female) from the two different
socioeconomic areas used in the main study. For judgments about
controllability participants were asked to rate each good item using
a 4-point scale – It is impossible/slightly possible/reasonably possi-
ble/certainly possible to make this happen, and rate each bad event
using a 4-point scale – It is impossible/slightly possible/reasonably
possible/certainly possible to prevent this happening. Participants
were asked to rank the 11 good events from the very best to the
least good event, and the 11 bad items from the very worst event
to the least bad event. The order of these four tasks was varied
between participants.
RESULTS
SUMMARY OF KEY ANALYSES
In order to compare the overall rates of unrealistic optimism
between India and England among two socioeconomic groups,
two 2× 2 (nationality by SES) analyses of variance were conducted
– one for comparative risk perceptions averaged across bad events,
and one for comparative risk perceptions averaged across good
events. To investigate whether rates of unrealistic optimism var-
ied by specific event two kinds of analyses were conducted. For
each event one sample t tests were used to establish whether each
group’s comparative risk estimate differed from zero (where zero
5The major five self-identification ethnic categories used in the UK Census
are White; Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups; Asian/Asian British (Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian); Black/African/Caribbean/Black British; and
Other ethnic group (Office for National Statistics, 2011).
would indicate no difference in expectation of an event happening
to self in comparison to the event happening to a similar other).
In addition, χ2 tests were used to compare the ratio of optimists
to pessimists within each group to a chance distribution. Finally,
based on the results of a factor analysis of event frequency, con-
trollability and desirability, their possible confounding role was
investigated using a series of multiple regressions to assess the
relationship of these factors to comparative optimism for bad and
good events for each of the four participant groups.
OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM AVERAGING ACROSS TYPES OF ITEM
Table 1 displays participants’ comparative estimates of the chances
of good and bad events happening in their own lives in com-
parison to the chances of those events happening in the lives of
people like themselves. Two 2× 2 (nationality by SES) analyses of
variance were conducted, i.e., good and bad events were analyzed
separately. Comparative optimism was shown for bad events, with
Indian participants showing higher levels of optimism than Eng-
lish participants [F(1,283)= 5.62, p= 0.018]. Averaging across the
11 negative items, Indians assessed their chances of experienc-
ing bad events as 5.9% less than people like them. This number
emanates from 77% assessing their chances across events as being
on average 8.4% less than others, 10% estimating their chances to
be the same as others, and 13% estimating their chances to be 4.5%
worse than others. English participants on average assessed their
chances of experiencing bad events as only 3.4% less than others.
This number emanates from 71% assessing their chances across
events as being on average 6.9% less than others, 7% estimating
their chances to be the same as others, and 22% estimating their
chances to be 7% worse than others. There was no effect for SES
[F(1,283)= 0.96, p= 0.327] nor was there an interaction between
SES and nationality [F(1,283)= 0.45, p= 0.505]. See Figure 1.
Optimism scores for bad events did not vary by gender or by task
order/questionnaire version.
The position regarding comparative optimism for good events
was more complex. There were no main effects for nationality
[F(1,283)= 0.06, p= 0.802] or SES [F(1,283)= 1.49, p= 0.223]
but there was an interaction effect between nationality and SES
Table 1 | Participants’ average estimates of the chances of events happening in their own lives in comparison to the chances of those events
happening in the lives of people like themselves.
Events Bad+ Good++
Socioeconomic status N M SD M SD
India Lower 100 −5.00*** 8.23 −2.60** 11.55
Higher 100 −6.72*** 8.32 3.66** 10.61
All 200 −5.86*** 8.30 0.53 11.50
England Lower 47 −3.23** 7.97 1.62 9.77
Higher 40 −3.56** 7.16 −1.25 10.59
All 87 −3.38*** 7.56 0.46 11.10
+On bad events, a negative score indicates comparative optimism.
++On good events, a negative score indicates comparative pessimism.
Values significantly different from zero (one sample t test) are marked with asterisks.
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
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FIGURE 1 | Relative optimism for bad events.
[F(1,283)= 1.75, p= 0.001]. Higher SES Indians were compar-
atively optimistic for good events, on average expecting their
chances of experiencing these events as 3.7% more than people
like them. This number emanates from 60% assessing their chances
across events as being on average 9.5% better than others, 14% esti-
mating their chances to be the same as others, and 26% estimating
their chances to be 7.7% worse than others. In contrast lower
SES Indians were comparatively pessimistic about good events on
average expecting their chances of experiencing these events to
be 2.6% less than other people like them. This number emanates
from 43% assessing their chances across events as being on average
12.3% less than others, 9% estimating their chances to be the same
as others, and 48% estimating their chances to be 5.6% better than
others. Averaging across events, higher and lower SES English par-
ticipants showed neither optimism nor pessimism for good events.
See Figure 2. Optimism/pessimism scores for good events did not
vary by gender or by task order/questionnaire version.
OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS
Tables 2 and 3 show responses to the individual items for bad
events according to average difference between expectation of
event for self and for other, where optimism is indicated by a
negative score – i.e., the expectation is that the chance for self is x
percent less likely than the chance for other. For any given item the
average will be comprised of the difference scores of three groups
of respondents: those who were optimistic, those who were nei-
ther optimistic nor pessimistic (and thus score zero), and those
who were pessimistic. For example, in the case of the lower SES
Indian sample and the item “committing suicide,” the average dif-
ference score of −10.4% emanates from 51% participants stating
that their chances were on average 22.5% less than others,42% stat-
ing their chances were the same as others, and 7% stating that their
chances were on average 14.3% more than others. Tables 4 and 5
FIGURE 2 | Relative optimism/pessimism for good events.
show responses to the individual items for good events according
to average difference between expectation of event for self and
for other, where optimism is indicated by a positive score – i.e.,
the expectation is that the chance for self is x percent more likely
than the chance for other, and pessimism is indicated by a negative
score – i.e., the expectation is that the chance for self is x percent
less likely than the chance for other.
Tables 2–5 also display responses for each item in terms of the
ratio of optimistic to pessimistic responses (optimism indicated
by a score above 1.0, and pessimism indicated by a score below
1.0). The ratio scores give more transparent information on score
distribution than is evident from the standard deviation of the
average difference scores. For example in the case of “Heart attack
before 60,” three times as many of higher SES Indian participants
expressed relative optimism as compared to relative pessimism,
whereas less than two times as many of lower SES Indian respon-
dents did so. Also, by not taking account of the extent of optimism
and pessimism, the ratio scores are not subject to the averaging
problem where, as in the case of the lower SES Indian group’s good
event scores, an average difference score of −2.6% came about
through a slightly smaller group of respondents being very pes-
simistic outweighing a slightly larger group of participants being
mildly optimistic. (In the case of the higher SES Indian participant
response for good events, and all four groups’ responses for bad
events, a significant deviation from zero arises by there being more
optimists than pessimists, showing approximately equal degrees of
optimism or pessimism respectively).
EVENT DESIRABILITY AND EVENT CONTROLLABILITY
As described in the section “Materials and Methods,” four fur-
ther groups of participants (matched for nationality, location and
SES) judged the events for desirability and controllability. The
desirability rankings of the 11 bad event items was very similar
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Table 2 | Bad events: comparative likelihood estimates, India.
Bad events India
Socioeconomic status All, N =200 Lower, n=100 Higher, n=100
% Chance
for other
% Self-other
difference1
Ratio2 % Self-other
difference1
Ratio2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Committing suicide 16.58 19.61 −10.42*** 16.14 7.00*** −11.10*** 17.75 29.00***
Divorce 17.68 18.40 −9.80*** 22.34 7.14*** −10.40*** 12.14 57.00***
Going bankrupt 20.52 20.61 −3.40 18.01 2.29** −8.80*** 16.10 10.60***
Early death of spouse/partner 23.00 20.64 −3.78* 17.67 1.89* −4.44** 17.36 3.20***
Son/daughter having a serious illness 26.36 17.78 −5.05*** 15.46 2.39*** −3.44** 12.54 3.22***
Serious accident on public transport 27.26 19.68 −2.42 14.08 1.80* −6.33*** 14.24 6.20***
Being burgled 29.64 22.00 −7.63*** 20.73 2.82*** −7.55*** 17.06 4.63***
Getting cancer 30.20 20.45 −4.80** 17.71 2.05** −5.35*** 13.80 3.80***
Heart attack before 60 33.32 20.00 −5.10** 18.94 1.72* −5.35** 20.32 3.00***
Financial problems 38.01 24.74 −3.57 26.02 1.33 −9.30*** 19.29 4.50***
Being run over 55.13 23.63 −3.88 22.00 1.76* −5.36*** 16.33 4.44***
Average 26.09 12.81 −5.00*** 8.23 −6.72*** 8.32
1% self-other difference: mean values significantly different from zero (one sample t test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
2Ratio of optimists to pessimists: values significantly different from 1 (chance distribution, χ2 test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
Table 3 | Bad events: comparative likelihood estimates, England.
Bad events England
Socioeconomic status All, N =87 Lower, n=47 Higher, n=40
% Chance
for other
% Self-other
difference1
Ratio2 % Self-other
difference1
Ratio2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Committing suicide 18.24 17.67 −6.96* 20.09 4.60*** −2.05 19.24 2.67**
Divorce 43.57 22.95 −12.27** 28.81 3.00** −14.75** 27.73 4.20**
Going bankrupt 23.95 20.42 −4.78* 15.84 3.00** −1.00 22.28 3.00*
Early death of spouse/partner 36.27 19.80 0.00 18.18 1.50 0.77 12.48 1.50
Son/daughter having a serious illness 29.51 21.38 −6.05* 17.95 2.80* −6.84** 14.16 12.00**
Serious accident on public transport 26.16 21.48 −0.87 16.40 1.29 −1.75 8.74 3.50
Being burgled 54.77 24.43 −2.61 16.21 1.67 −2.00 15.88 2.00
Getting cancer 43.84 20.82 3.70 17.98 0.92 3.00 10.18 0.50
Heart attack before 60 33.37 18.64 −3.91 19.50 2.22* −5.00* 14.85 3.40*
Financial problems 48.37 21.79 −1.30 23.92 1.00 −2.00 22.78 1.78
Being run over 55.11 19.93 0.44 10.21 0.63 −1.75 8.44 2.00
Average 35.82 13.69 −3.23** 7.97 −3.56** 7.16
1% self-other difference: mean values significantly different from zero (one sample t test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
2Ratio of optimists to pessimists: values significantly different from 1 (chance distribution, χ2 test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
between nationalities [rho(9)= 0.89, p< 0.001] and did not vary
by SES. Early death of spouse and suicide were rated as the very
worst events and financial difficulties and being burgled as the
least bad events. Within nationalities the ranking of the 11 good
event items did not vary by SES, but the desirability rankings of the
good events between nationalities was not similar [rho(9)= 0.48,
p= 0.482]. For Indian participants the highest ranking events were
“success for self or spouse at work” and “son or daughter doing
really well at school” and the lowest ranking events were “win-
ning the lottery” and “unexpectedly inheriting some money.” For
English participants the highest ranking events were “good health
in old age” and “son or daughter being happily married” and the
lowest ranking events were “moving to a better house” and “exotic
foreign travel.”
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Table 4 | Good events: comparative likelihood estimates, India.
Good events India
Socioeconomic status All, N =200 Lower, n=100 Higher, n=100
% Chance
for other
% Self-other
difference1
Ratio2 % Self-other
difference1
Ratio2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Unexpectedly inheriting some money 21.36 19.74 −12.65*** 19.52 0.11*** −3.90 21.41 0.22***
Winning the lottery 22.74 21.51 −8.67*** 21.11 0.43** −12.22*** 20.08 0.09***
Exotic foreign travel 38.32 27.64 −4.95 27.08 0.57* 13.30*** 27.04 3.71***
Son/daughter getting a very good job 40.71 25.70 −8.08*** 24.07 0.48** 3.06 22.49 1.63
Good health in old age 46.68 21.88 1.30 25.92 0.87 3.74 22.14 1.71*
Moving to a better house 48.95 26.48 2.32 26.58 1.38 2.10 23.54 1.50
Son or daughter does well at school 49.70 26.13 −0.10 23.33 0.83 8.56*** 21.08 2.88***
Living a long life 50.81 22.37 1.24 22.03 1.24 0.40 17.46 1.43
Son/daughter being happily married 52.78 23.81 −1.03 20.96 0.78 7.42** 14.65 5.63***
Success for self or spouse at work 55.13 23.63 0.90 20.77 1.28 10.61*** 21.12 4.08***
Being on good terms with relatives 56.03 25.08 2.02 28.67 1.54 10.60*** 22.10 5.30***
Average 44.23 14.99 −2.60** 11.55 3.66*** 10.61
1% self-other difference: mean values significantly different from zero (one sample t test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
2Ratio of optimists to pessimists: values significantly different from 1 (chance distribution, χ2 test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
Table 5 | Good events: comparative likelihood estimates, England.
Good events England
Socioeconomic status All, N =87 Lower, n=47 Higher, n=40
% Chance
for other
% Self-other
difference1
Ratio2 % Self-other
difference1
Ratio2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Unexpectedly inheriting some money 31.53 23.12 −12.17*** 24.22 0.18*** −10.00* 24.28 0.17***
Winning the lottery 11.55 16.17 −3.56 18.08 0.31* −2.82 10.11 0.10**
Exotic foreign travel 57.33 25.73 8.04 30.97 1.62 11.75* 32.73 4.20**
Son/daughter getting a very good job 45.49 22.56 2.79 22.20 1.89 −4.10 25.69 0.91
Good health in old age 55.47 16.50 3.91* 12.06 2.57* −3.75 16.12 0.79
Moving to a better house 50.00 22.49 −1.09 25.39 0.88 −1.00 24.68 1.00
Son or daughter does well at school 50.39 23.38 5.85 25.19 2.25* −2.97 28.54 1.75
Living a long life 58.59 18.53 3.70 18.81 2.38* 1.03 17.80 1.20
Son/daughter being happily married 43.00 20.65 1.67 17.06 1.67 −4.21 18.21 0.78
Success for self or spouse at work 55.12 19.93 0.87 17.70 1.56 −2.00 14.36 0.77
Being on good terms with relatives 58.14 20.44 10.00** 20.43 6.25*** 6.25 21.68 3.29**
Average 47.86 12.55 1.62 9.77 −1.25 10.59
1% self-other difference: mean values significantly different from zero (one sample t test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
2Ratio of optimists to pessimists: values significantly different from 1 (chance distribution, χ2 test) are marked with asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).
In terms of absolute amount of controllability (where 1 sig-
nified “impossible to control” and 4 signified “certainly possible
to make this happen/prevent this happening”), good events were
rated 2.44 (SD= 0.35, N= 84) and this did not vary by national-
ity or by SES as simple main effects or in interaction. On average,
bad events were rated 2.38 (SD= 0.40, N = 88) but in this case
English participants rated such events as slightly less controllable
(M= 2.21, SD= 0.37) than did Indian participants [M = 2.48,
SD= 0.38; F(1,85)= 10.65, p= 0.002]. These judgments were not
affected by SES as a main effect or in interaction with nationality.
The ranking of bad event items for controllability was very
similar between nationalities (rho(9)= 0.77, p= 0.005), and did
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not vary by SES. The highest controllability scores were given to
committing suicide, going bankrupt and divorce; low control-
lability scores were given to son/daughter’s serious illness, early
death of spouse, and cancer. Within nationalities, the ranking of
good event items for controllability did not vary by SES, but the
rankings between nationalities were not similar [rho(9)= 0.39,
p= 0.233]. Indian participants gave relatively high controllability
scores to “son/daughter doing well at school” and “son/daughter
being happily married,” and a relatively low controllability score
to “exotic foreign travel.” In contrast English participants gave
relatively high controllability scores to “exotic foreign travel” and
“moving to a better house,”and a relatively low controllability score
to “son/daughter being happily married.”
A further analysis of the perception of good events was con-
ducted in light of the apparent nationality differences in how
the items were ranked for desirability and for controllability. As
described above, the Indian informants who evaluated the suitabil-
ity of Weinstein’s (1980) list of good and bad events, nominated 10
new items, five of which consisted of events in the lives of close rela-
tives rather than directly in the life of self. Examples of such events
were “son/daughter serious illness” and “son/daughter getting a
good job.” As a consequence of these additions, the list of 11 good
event items was composed of five items in the lives of close relatives
and six items more explicitly in the life of self. A repeated measures
ANOVA indicates that while both Indian and English participants
ranked the good event items involving others as more desirable
than the items involving self [F(1,90)= 32.21, p< 0.001], there
is a suggestion that this difference was more striking for Indian
than for English participants [average difference in rank between
items involving others and items involving self: India= 2.08,
SD= 2.23; England= 1.07, SD= 2.74; F(1,90)= 3.65, p= 0.059].
A repeated measures ANOVA indicates that while both Indian
and English participants rated the good event items involv-
ing others as more controllable than the items involving self
[F(1,90)= 69.36, p < 0.001], this difference was more pronounced
for Indian than for English participants [average difference in
controllability scores between items involving others and items
involving self: India= 0.70, SD= 0.58; England= 0.40, SD= 0.59;
F(1,90)= 5.16, p= 0.026]. SES was not a significant factor in
either of the two repeated ANOVAS.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVENT FREQUENCY, DESIRABILITY,
CONTROLLABILITY, AND OPTIMISM
Tables 2–5 show the average estimates for bad and good event
frequency given by participants when considering the chances
of the “other.” Bad events were considered to be less frequent
than were good events, and this was true for Indian and Eng-
lish participants. Across bad events, Indians gave on average lower
frequencies (M = 26.1%, SD= 12.81) than did English partici-
pants [M= 35.8%, SD= 13.69; F(1,283)= 28.25, p < 0.001]. This
did not vary by SES, nor was there an interaction between SES
and nationality. Across good events, Indians on average estimated
slightly lower frequencies (M= 44.3%, SD= 14.99) than did
English participants [M = 47.9%, SD= 12.55; F(1,283)= 3.93,
p= 0.049]. This did not vary by SES, but the interaction between
SES and nationality approached significance [F(1,283)= 3.45,
p= 0.064] suggesting that the lower Indian frequencies were a
feature of the lower SES Indians’ judgments (40.7%, SD= 16.48)
and not of the higher SES Indians’ judgments whose frequency
scores averaged at 47.3% (SD= 12.89) and were thus very similar
to the judged frequencies offered by the English participants.
Factor analysis was used to explore the relationship between
event frequency (for “similar others”), event controllability and
event desirability as initial multiple regressions looking at the rela-
tionship of these three variables to optimism/pessimism for bad
and good events separately, revealed high levels of multicollinearity
between the three independent variables (indicated by pair-wise
correlations above 0.80 and VIF values >5). A Principal Com-
ponents Factor Analysis using varimax rotation of the judgments
of bad events yielded two factors with Eigen values greater than
1.0 which accounted for 88% in variance in the data. Factor 1
explained 47% of the variance and comprised controllability and
desirability. Factor 2 explained 41% of the variance and comprised
event frequency. A series of four multiple regressions, as displayed
in Table 6, showed that these factors relate to optimism difference
scores but only in the case of higher SES Indians. For this group
higher optimism was expressed about events which were judged
as more controllable and less undesirable (i.e., ranked as less bad
among bad events). For example, participants showed high levels
of optimism about divorce (i.e., thought that their chances of expe-
riencing this event were less than the chance for similar others).
As an event divorce was rated as relatively controllable and not as
undesirable as events such as getting cancer. While still optimistic,
higher SES Indians were less optimistic about items such early
death of spouse, regarded as relatively uncontrollable and highly
undesirable. For higher SES Indians event frequency, unrelated
to desirability or controllability, negatively predicted relative opti-
mism although less powerfully than desirability/controllability. As
an example, higher levels of optimism were expressed in relation
to going bankrupt (judged as a low frequency event for “similar
others”) and lower relative optimism was expressed in relation
to having a heart attack before 60 (judged as a relatively higher
frequency event for “similar others”).
A Principal Components Factor Analysis of the judgments of
good events yielded only one factor with an Eigen value greater
than 1.0 which accounted for 70% of the variance in the data.
All three variables loaded highly on the factor, indicating that
good events judged to be more frequent for “similar others” were
also judged to be more desirable and more controllable. As can
be seen in Table 6, multiple regressions indicated that this fac-
tor was significantly related to optimism/pessimism in three of
the four groups. For example, higher SES Indians expected to
be less likely than similar others to win the lottery (a less val-
ued event judged as relatively uncommon and uncontrollable),
but they expected to be more likely than similar others to experi-
ence success at work (a highly valued event judged to be relatively
common and controllable). The relationship between the con-
trollability/desirability/frequency factor and optimism/pessimism
was particularly strong for the lower SES Indian group who,
as the final row of Table 4 makes clear, on average were com-
paratively pessimistic about their chances of experiencing good
events. In their case a positive correlation between the factor and
optimism/pessimism indicates that they were particularly pes-
simistic regarding the rarer, less controllable, and comparatively
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Table 6 | Regression coefficients showing the relationship of event controllability, desirability, and frequency to comparative
optimism/pessimism.
Country India England
Socioeconomic status Lower Higher Lower Higher
t p t p t p t p
BAD EVENTS
Factor 1, Controllability/desirability 1.30 0.231 3.41 0.009 1.21 0.261 −0.59 0.574
Factor 2, Frequency −1.04 0.328 −2.31 0.050 −0.56 0.592 −0.15 0.887
Regression F (2,10) 1.96 0.203 8.73 0.010 0.81 0.480 0.17 0.850
GOOD EVENTS
Factor 1, Controllability/desirability/frequency 4.66 0.001 3.49 0.007 3.31 0.009 1.69 0.130
Regression F (1,10) 21.68 0.001 12.19 0.007 10.95 0.009 2.85 0.130
less valued events (such as“unexpectedly inheriting some money”)
and neither optimistic or pessimistic about events regarded as
the more frequent, more controllable, and more valuable (such as
“success for self/spouse at work”).
Taken as a whole the results show that, for three of the
four groups studied, neither event controllability/desirability nor
frequency played a part in the determination of relative opti-
mism for bad events. For good events however, gradations
in relative optimism/pessimism related to item controllabil-
ity/desirability/frequency for three of the four groups studied.
More highly valued events were judged more controllable and
more frequent than less valued events, and were more subject to
relative optimism (or as in the case of the lower SES Indian sample
were less subject to relative pessimism).
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The primary aim of the study was to investigate unrealistic opti-
mism in two different cultures, with participants drawn from two
different socioeconomic groups within those cultures. For bad
events, participants from both socioeconomic groups in India and
England showed comparative optimism as they considered their
chances of experiencing such events to be less than the chances of
other people like themselves experiencing those events. This was
so whether optimism was judged by the average of respondents’
self-other difference scores per event, or the average of those scores
across 11 events, or in terms of the ratio of optimists to pessimists
per event. Further, Indian participants showed greater optimism
regarding bad events than did English participants. The picture
changed however for good events. Although not optimistic on
every item, the higher SES Indian group on average continued
to show comparative optimism expecting to be more likely to
experience these events than other people like themselves. But
in contrast, the lower SES Indian group on average showed pes-
simism regarding their chances of experiencing good events which
came about through being outright pessimistic on some items and
neither optimistic or pessimistic on the remaining items. Across
good items, English participants of both socioeconomic groups
averaged to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
Much of the research on comparative optimism has investigated
respondents’ expectations about their likelihood of experiencing
negative life events. It is this kind of research, particularly when
respondents are invited to make separate judgments about their
own and “the other’s” chances, that finds low or zero rates of com-
parative optimism among those from East Asian cultures (Heine
and Hamamura, 2007; Rose et al., 2008). The current study, despite
asking participants to make separate judgments about their own
chances and the chances for others, found that Indian participants
showed high rates of comparative optimism for negative events.
Matsumoto (2007) has lamented the tendency of researchers tak-
ing“findings from one or a few countries from the Asian continent,
especially East Asia, and making generalized interpretations about
‘Asia’ and ‘Asians’ in general” (p. 47). The clear finding in the
current study that Indian participants showed unrealistic opti-
mism on negative items, and that wealthier Indian participants
also showed unrealistic optimism on positive items, demonstrates
that the lack of unrealistic optimism found in some East Asian
cultures is not generalizable to other Asian cultures.
The most frequent explanation of cultural differences in unre-
alistic optimism relates optimism to the tendency to self-enhance
thought to be characteristic of individualistic cultures comprised
of independent selves. Lack of unrealistic optimism is held to relate
to a reluctance to self-enhance thought to be characteristic of a col-
lectivist culture comprised of interdependent selves (Heine, 2003).
The high rate of unrealistic optimism shown by the Indian par-
ticipants in the current study makes it clear that it is possible to
demonstrate self-enhancement and yet be from a collectivist Asian
culture. One response to this finding might be that perhaps India
is not a very collectivist culture. Indeed Sinha and Tripathi (1994)
note that even though India does not occupy a very low place on
the Individualism-Collectivism scale, the categorization of India
as collectivist has “somehow gotten stuck to the Indian culture”
(p. 124). Citing Tripathi (1988), Mishra (1994) proposes that for
Indians in-group orientation may not signify collectivism in the
“normal” sense but be used as a strategy for enhancement of the
self or one’s own family.
A different interpretation of the results of the current study is
that collectivism in India takes a different form from collectivism
in East Asian cultures and is not associated with self-effacement.
On the basis of a cultural analysis and questionnaire survey
responses Sinha and Tripathi (1994) propose that the Indian form
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of collectivism contain important strands of individualism, and
that whether collectivist or individualist values determine behav-
ior among Indians is very context dependent. In a similar vein,
in a discussion of the “Indian mindset” and negotiating behav-
ior, Kumar (2004; citing Sinha and Kanungo, 1997) suggests that
while managers’“primary mode of behavior reflects the prevalence
of traditional Hindu values such as collectivism and high power
distance, the secondary mode reflects the inculcation of values
such as individualism and pragmatism” (p. 42). Also relevant to
the current study’s demonstration of unrealistic optimism among
Indian participants is Kumar’s (2004) depiction of a mode of
thought he labels as“Brahmanical idealism,”characterized by over-
optimistic confidence and “wishful thinking that may be divorced
from empirical reality to an excessively high degree”(p. 45). Rather
than classify cultures as collectivist or individualistic, and selves as
interdependent or individualist, it may be more useful to employ
Kagitcibasi’s (2005) twofold orthogonal dimensions of agency
(autonomy-heteronomy) and interpersonal distance (separation-
relatedness), and describe the Indian self as autonomous-related
in comparison to the Western autonomous-separate self.
As already discussed, Indian participants showed greater opti-
mism than did English participants on negative events, and on
positive events higher SES Indians also showed optimism and were
the only group to do so. Broadly this indicates a greater degree of
optimism and self-enhancement among Indian than English par-
ticipants. Loughnan et al. (2011) proposed that self-enhancement
relates to income inequality and their measure of choice was the
Gini coefficient. However in explaining the apparent connection
between self-enhancement and income inequality, Loughnan et al.
(2011) suggest that “it is unlikely that economic inequality directly
leads to biased self-perception” (p. 1257; italics our own). Rather
they argue that self-enhancement relates to intervening factors
that result from socioeconomic differences. Loughnan et al. (2011)
develop their explanatory model with reference to Wilkinson and
Pickett’s (2010) proposal that living in an unequal society engen-
ders social evaluation anxiety which itself increases the tendency
to self-promote and self-enhance. If there are such psychological
consequences of living in an unequal society, these are likely to
be driven by perceptions of inequality rather than inequality as
measured by statisticians. A society will “feel” very unequal when,
for example as in India, a substantial proportion of the population
live below the international poverty line alongside other members
of the same society living in extreme affluence. It is also the case
that although social stratification is a historic and current feature
of English society, India’s social structure is characterized not only
by socioeconomic class but also by elaborate hierarchy and differ-
entiation in the form of caste (Srinivas, 1996; Desai and Dubey,
2011). India also scores much higher than the UK on Hofstede’s
Power Distance dimension thought to measure the extent to which
hierarchy and inequality is accepted in a society6. Further, Bard-
han (2009) has suggested that a like-with-like measure of income
(as opposed to consumption) inequality would give India a Gini
coefficient of income inequality of 53.5%, i.e., much higher than
6Power distance scores: India, 77; UK, 35 (http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.
html).
the UK’s score of 36%. In many senses, inequality and social dif-
ferentiation in India is arguably greater than in the UK, and the
higher rate of unrealistic optimism shown by Indian as compared
to English participants thus supports Loughnan et al.’s (2011)
general proposition that self-enhancement relates to inequality in
society7.
An interesting aspect of the data is the contrasting profiles of
the higher and lower SES Indian groups. The higher SES Indians
were the only group in the study to show optimism for both bad
and good events. For this group both bad and good events deemed
to be more controllable attracted greater optimism. This supports
McKenna’s (1993) proposition view that unrealistic optimism is
not so much a general generalized expectancy for a positive out-
come but more closely related to the extent to which participants
consider that they have control over the outcome. But it also sug-
gests that the illusion of control is as an influential factor in the
mindset of Indians as it has been held to be in the Western mind-
set, and accords with Shweder’s (2008) observation that, contrary
to what is often believed by Westerners, Hindus do have a strong
sense of agency8,9.
While optimistic bias may promote general psychological well-
being (Taylor and Brown, 1988), there is evidence that it may at
the same time deter those at risk from engaging in health promot-
ing behaviors (Dillard et al., 2006). In the current study, among
the higher SES Indians who rated their chances of having a heart
attack as being different from that of others, 75% displayed opti-
mism, with the modal response being that their own chance was
20% less than that others. Since for this group optimism regard-
ing having a heart attack correlated very highly with optimism on
many other items such as not going bankrupt, and not having an
accident while on public transport, it can be safely interpreted that
the optimism relates to a general psychological orientation rather
than reflecting the practice of actual health promoting behaviors.
Reddy and Yusuf (1998) suggest that community awareness of the
dangers of cardiovascular disease is not high in countries such as
India, and further that “the transition toward becoming indus-
trial market economies is unleashing consumer aspirations that
impatiently seek an affluent and indulgent lifestyle” (p. 601). The
authors speculate that “messages of moderation may not be wel-
come during such periods of change” (p. 601). The current study
suggests that in India as in the UK, unrealistic optimism is likely
to play a part in people’s inattention to or even rejection of health
messages.
A striking feature of the current study is that although lower SES
Indian participants showed unrealistic optimism on bad events,
they did not show it on good events. In fact, their average score on
good events was pessimistic which was in stark contrast to higher
SES Indian participants who averaged as optimistic for the same
events. For lower SES Indians (as was the case for two of the three
7In Loughnan et al.’s (2011) own study power distance did not add to the variance
in self-enhancement explained by the Gini coefficient, but the authors do not report
whether power distance predicted self-enhancement in a pair-wise comparison.
8In Shweder’s view “the “Western” notion that Hindus in the “East” are passive,
lacking in a sense of agency or internal control and resigned to their fate, is one of
the greatest of all cross-cultural misunderstandings” (2008, p. 76).
9See Savani et al. (2008) for a discussion of the different forms that agency may take
in Indian and North American cultural contexts.
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other groups, and for the fourth group the trend was in the same
direction) optimism for the good events was related to events being
judged as more controllable, more highly valued and estimated as
more frequent. But as has already been pointed out for lower SES
Indians,“optimism” on good events was not optimism, but merely
lack of pessimism. Both Indian groups regarded events such as
work success, moving to a better house, son/daughter being hap-
pily married as frequent, valued, and relatively controllable10. But
while higher SES Indians regarded their chances of experiencing
such events as being greater than that of similar others, lower SES
Indians did not. A fear of the evil eye is one possible explanation
for lack of self-enhancement on good items. Anthropologists and
psychologists have described the evil eye belief, common in India,
as the fear of one’s good fortune arousing jealousy in others and
consequently bringing bad luck to the self (Pocock, 1973; Anan-
dalakshmi, 1978; Shweder, 2008). The widespread sale of amulets
and the frequent performance of rituals to avert the evil eye testify
to the strength of the belief in the evil eye in modern India. Such a
belief would tend to encourage self-effacement in estimating one’s
chances of experiencing the good things in life, particularly regard-
ing events involving one’s children11. Further research is needed to
examine whether the prevalence of such beliefs varies between dif-
ferent socioeconomic communities in India, and more generally
whether the self-effacement in regard to good events shown by the
poorer Indians in this study is merely a “performance” – i.e., is dri-
ven by a wish not to publically claim the prospect of good fortune,
in a manner reminiscent of modesty, which Kurman (2003) sug-
gests is a plausible determinant of self-effacing behavior in some
collectivist cultures.
An alternative explanation for lack of apparent optimism on
good items is that for some people lack of optimism – or indeed
comparative pessimism – particularly in regard to common valued
events, reflects a depressive state of mind12. Although employed
and housed, the lower SES group live much closer to the economic
margin and destitution than do the higher SES Indian group. Given
the well established relationship between material hardship, finan-
cial strain and depression (Dohrenwend et al., 1992; Lorant et al.,
2007), that depression might be more common among the lower
SES group in India is unsurprising. A large scale epidemiologi-
cal study in Chennai attests to the prevalence of depression in
urban India and its relation to economic hardship. Self-reported
10That Indian participants regarded“a son/daughter being happily married”as“con-
trollable” reflects the arranged marriage system common in India. In a large scale
survey involving 2496 women in Maharashtra aged 25–49, respondents indicate
3% of marriages had been self-arranged; 34% jointly arranged by parent and self;
34% arranged by parents with self having some say/consent in the choice; and 29%
parent-arranged marriages where self had no say in choice of partner (Banerji et al.,
2008). In arranging a marriage, by choosing a suitable spouse parents hope to ensure
the well-being of their child (Medora, 2003).
11Parents are particularly anxious not to attract the evil eye by over-praising a child’s
beauty or achievement (Roland, 1988).
12In an exploration of cognitive biases in non-human animals, Matheson et al.
(2007) studied “optimistic” response biases in wild-caught captive European star-
lings, trained to discriminate between two signals differentially associated with a
better or less good outcome (i.e., instant or delayed food). Birds whose cages were
bigger and enriched showed greater optimism in the face of an ambiguous signal in
comparison to birds in smaller and unenriched cages. The authors liken the response
of the later group to that of “depressive realism” in humans.
depression (measured by a locally modified version of the Patient
Health Questionnaire) was as high as 19.3% in the low income
group as compared to 5.9% in the higher income group (Poon-
gothai et al., 2009). The authors of the Chennai study conclude
that there is a clear need to increase mental health services in
India. In the current study nearly half of the lower SES Indian
group expressed pessimism on as many as five or more of the 11
positive items. That this group may be especially vulnerable to
depression tallies with ethnographic depictions of urban “locally
oriented middle class” Indians who, notwithstanding rapid eco-
nomic growth in India during the last three decades, continue
to experience limited economic opportunities for themselves and
their children (Derné, 2008), and feel insecure in the face of the
threat of “real impoverishment” (Shurmer-Smith, 2000, p. 52).
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE
CURRENT STUDY
Chambers and Windschitl (2004) and Rose et al. (2008) argue that
a powerful cognitive bias operates in judgment tasks, in that peo-
ple pay relatively careful attention to event base rate information
when judging their own probability of experiencing an event, but
overestimate the base rate for rare events and underestimate it for
common events when judging the probability of others experi-
encing the same event. The operation of this egocentric bias is
held to lead to unrealistic optimism for infrequent negative events
and unrealistic pessimism for frequent negative events. In the cur-
rent study the frequency of bad event items did affect optimism,
although the effect was relative rather than absolute and only evi-
dent in one group. For higher SES Indians greater optimism was
shown for the least frequent bad events. They did not show pes-
simism for the more frequent bad events, although they did show
less optimism for such events. Further research is needed to exam-
ine the relationship between optimism and event frequency, by
varying events by their absolute frequency as well as by their fre-
quency relative to each other. In the current study even the rarer
bad events were judged to be quite common. This contrasts with
studies which have used events such as being struck by lightning.
There was stronger evidence of base rate bias in opti-
mism/pessimism for good events. In the case of good events a
base rate bias of the kind suggested by Chambers and Windschitl
(2004) and Rose et al. (2008) would produce pessimism for rare
events and optimism for frequent events. This pattern was found
for three of the four groups in the current study. However the data
cannot be taken as giving clear support for the base rate explana-
tion of unrealistic optimism as event frequency for good events
was confounded with rank and controllability. The number of
events was insufficient to permit the disentanglement of frequency,
desirability and controllability in the manner of Chambers et al.
(2003).
Harris and Hahn (2011) have recently and controversially sug-
gested that the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism is neither a
genuine cognitive nor motivational risk bias but is only an artifact
of the kinds of response scales conventionally used in unrealis-
tic optimism studies. They are particularly concerned with the
risk perception of rare negative events, and suggest that the few
respondents who for some reason have a rational reason to be
pessimistic regarding the risk in question (for example through
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a known genetic predisposition to a rare disease) do not get a
chance to register the full extent of their pessimism as the design
of response scales does not enable their responses to balance the
more moderate optimism of the majority who have a reason to
be optimistic (for example by knowing they are not in an at risk
group for the disease in question). It is unlikely that the current
study is subject to this problem as few of the events were very rare
or of the kind associated with firm probability forecasts.
In this, as in many studies in social psychology, participants
are requested to respond to a set of stimuli thought to represent
categories of theoretical interest, and much may depend on the
stimuli chosen by the researchers (Judd et al., 2012). In the cur-
rent study Weinstein’s original list of good and bad events was
developed by a small group of Marathi-English speaking Indian
advisors to ensure that the list was suitable for use by Indian
participants. It was notable that many of the substitutions con-
sisted of events in the lives of close relatives rather than in the life
of self, and that this disproportionately affected the list of good
rather than bad events. While Indian and English participants
ranked the good event items involving others as more desirable
and more controllable than the good items involving self, this ten-
dency was more striking for Indian than for English participants.
It is possible that the English participants’ lack of optimism for
good events relates in part to the list being somewhat culturally
alien.
Noting that many studies only ask participants to make judg-
ments of life events chosen by the researcher, Hoorens et al.
(2008) invited participants to nominate their own items. Their
data demonstrated comparative optimism in that student partic-
ipants listed more desirable and fewer neutral and undesirable
events in their future in comparison to the average student’s future,
and also showed comparative optimism in their estimates of the
likelihood of those events. Many of the events listed were simi-
lar to standard researcher generated lists, and also showed overlap
with some of the new items suggested by Indian participants in
the current study (e.g., being involved in a serious accident; early
death of spouse/partner). Nevertheless it was notable that three
of the 10 new items suggested in India involved money, which
brought the number of explicitly financial items to a total of
six items, four of which were located in the good event list. All
four groups of participants showed pessimism on two good events
directly related to finance (“unexpectedly inheriting some money”
and “winning the lottery”). Lower SES Indian participants were
also pessimistic regarding another financial based event (“exotic
foreign travel”) and the only bad item they were not optimistic
about was their relative chance of experiencing “financial prob-
lems.” But it is unlikely that these financially related events can be
held responsible for the lack of optimism shown for good events.
Subjecting the four financial good items to Cronbach reliability
testing only generated an alpha of 0.374 for the lower SES Indians
(and was no higher for any of the other groups) indicating that for
individuals pessimism/optimism judgments on financial items do
not cohere13
13The Cronbach’s alpha for all six financial items (two bad, four good) was also low:
0.306 whole sample, 0.208 lower SES Indian group.
In terms of absolute levels of optimism/pessimism on
good events, lower SES Indians were also pessimistic about
“son/daughter getting a very good job,” and not optimistic on
any of the remaining good event items even though some of those
items had been judged by a comparable group of participants
as controllable – i.e., as reasonably or even certainly possible to
make happen. Further research is needed to explore what is meant
by “controllable,” as events may be being viewed as controllable
by others but not by the self. In this case the lower SES Indian
participants’ striking lack of optimism about good events in com-
parison to the higher SES Indian participants may indeed signal a
somewhat dejected approach to the future. As already indicated,
averaging across all good items, 43% of the lower SES Indian group
were pessimistic about their relative chances of experiencing those
items in comparison to people like themselves. The comparable
figure among the higher SES Indian group was only 26%.
It was considered important to sample from different socioeco-
nomic groups not only in relation to the study’s particular interest
in inequality but also because psychology in general has been guilty
of oversampling from a very restricted age and educational pool
with possible consequent problems for the generalizability of stud-
ies’ results (Henrich et al., 2010). The use of different items and
different rating scales renders cross-study comparisons problem-
atic. However the English middle aged participants in the current
study showed a clear pattern of unrealistic optimism on negative
events, very similar to patterns of unrealistic optimism found in
adult and student samples in North America. The English partic-
ipants were randomly selected from non-academic employees in
lower managerial and intermediate occupations at a university in
the south of England. With the aim of matching occupation and
status to the English groups, Indian participants were recruited
from housing associations in two suburban areas, one middle
class and one lower middle class, in Maharashtra. There is no rea-
son to regard any of the four groups as atypical, but only further
research can establish the generality of the findings of the current
study to other parts of England and India, and to non-Hindus
in India. More interesting still would be to study unrealistic opti-
mism among participants more economically deprived than those
sampled in the current study.
CONCLUSION
A number of universalist discourses surround research on unreal-
istic optimism. Neuropsychologists such Sharot et al. (2011) regard
the optimism bias as a “pervasive human trait” motivating adap-
tive behavior in the present toward a future goal. For such authors
the model is of “the tendency (of the healthy brain) to generate
images of positive future events” (Sharot et al., 2007, p. 102), and a
lack of optimism is thought to indicate poor mental health. A uni-
versalist approach is also taken by those who emphasize the role
of cognitive biases in social comparative judgments (Windschitl
et al., 2008).
Motivational explanations for unrealistic optimism have been
more common among researchers whose prime interest is in
cultural comparison. A key focus has been the relationship of self-
enhancement and self-effacement to selves contrasted in terms
independence/interdependence and societies contrasting in indi-
vidualism/collectivism. In the years following the work of Hoftsede
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(1980, 2001) and Triandis (1988, 1995), it has been suggested
that the collectivism of some cultures such as Japan has been
overstated and, in any event, is locally variable and has been
subject to change (Matsumoto, 1999, 2002; Takano and Sogon,
2008; Yamawaki, 2012). Such a point of view might be inter-
preted as rendering collectivism/individualism (and the inter-
dependent/individual self construct) less useful as explanations
for east/west differences in unrealistic optimism than formerly
thought. Nevertheless, there are “profound cultural differences in
the ways people come to understand themselves” (Heine, 2012, p.
195), and categorizations such as interdependence/independence
and collectivism/individualism have been and will continue to
stimulate the formation of hypotheses about culture and behavior.
The current research used a methodology which to date has
found less or no unrealistic optimism in certain East Asian collec-
tivist cultures. But in this study Indian participants showed even
higher levels of unrealistic optimism, particularly for bad events,
than did English participants. Broadening the field of enquiry to
other Asian societies, such as India, underlines the complexity
of the relationship of self-enhancement and self-effacement to
comparative optimism.
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